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The paper discusses Matthew Lipman’s approach to inquiry as shaped 
and fashioned by John Dewey’s model of scientific inquiry. Although 
Lipman’s program adopted the major aspects of Dewey’s pedagogy, at 
least two characteristics of that program stand out as radically differ-
ent—his use of relatively free-form philosophical discussions to teach 
complex thinking, and his formulation and development  of what he 
called a “community of inquiry” as a pedagogical setting for holding 
and sustaining such discussions. Here Lipman’s Philosophy for Chil-
dren program is seen as a framework for the design and performance 
of philosophical inquiry in the disciplines—something that he himself 
contemplated but never realized. In this paper I outline a few possible 
directions for opening spaces in school-based mathematical practices 
for philosophical deliberation in a community of inquiry, Lipman style.  
I argue that such an opening represents a potential expansion of stu-
dents’ mathematical experiences—a way of nurturing and integrating a 
sense of the philosophical perspectives of the discipline into the regular 
math class that is larger and more encompassing, and that promises to 
provide bridges for establishing richer and more meaningful connec-
tions and interactions with students’ personal experience, with other 
disciplines, and with the broader culture; and thus a prime example of 
what Dewey called “educative experience.”
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Introduction
One of John Dewey’s major contributions to the reconstruction of the educational 
process was in his understanding that education needed to develop a working re-
lationship between the refined end-products of inquiry that are codified and sedi-
mented in textbooks, and the raw subject matter inquiry that is natural to the young. 
Such inquiry, he was convinced, should be shaped and fashioned to the well-known 
model of scientific inquiry which he set forth in How We Think (Dewey, 1933).  In 
that same book, he describes “reflective thinking” as a special kind of ratiocina-
tion that is aware of its means and consequences, and thus is a major instrument 
in discipline-based inquiry. Dewey’s “scientific method” became a blueprint for the 
various critical thinking programs that emerged in the US in the 1970s, and a for-
mative influence on Matthew Lipman’s Philosophy for Children program, which 
was also developed during that decade. 
Although Lipman’s program adopted the major aspects of Dewey’s pedagogy, 
at least two characteristics of the program stand out as radically different—his use 
of relatively free-form philosophical discussions to teach complex thinking, and 
his formulation and development of what he called a “community of inquiry” (CI) 
as a pedagogical setting for holding and sustaining such discussions. As Lipman 
notes, Dewey never took up the question of the educational use of philosophy in 
the classroom, nor did he conceive of his model of scientific inquiry as of particular 
use for classroom philosophical inquiry (Lipman, 2003). On the other hand, Lip-
man seems to have seen philosophical inquiry as a more promising way to formu-
late an inquiry-based educational model than the scientific method. He wrote, “I 
saw philosophy as the discipline par excellence for making sense of things and for 
preparing students to think in the more specific disciplines” (Lipman, 1996, p. xv). 
Lipman’s community of philosophical inquiry is in fact a creative compilation 
of C.S. Peirce’s (1931/32) community of scientific inquirers, Josiah Royce’s (1968) 
community of interpretation, which takes on Dewey’s (1933) notion of scientific 
inquiry as originating in everyday problem solving, and G. H. Mead’s (1934) no-
tion of the genesis of the community through communication and of the “thinking 
self” through internalizing that communication. As just noted, Dewey’s idea for 
the reconstruction of education follows the lines of scientific inquiry, and Lipman’s 
is focused on the philosophical. The fact that reflective thinking operates in both 
the scientific and the philosophical community of inquiry makes it operationally 
possible to conceive of a discipline-based inquiry practice that combines both di-
mensions, and to envision them as shifting between the one and the other. Both 
dimensions can complement each other, in that the scientific or mathematical can 
provide grounding and material for more general philosophical thinking, and the 
philosophical can help to analyze and clarify the meanings of scientific concepts, 
explore the assumptions of the discipline, and investigate what a mathematical or 
scientific description can and cannot tell us about the reality it describes, as well 
as what the implications of the uses of science and mathematics in society are or 
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might be. Thus each type of inquiry can add extra depth to the other, and also help 
us increase our awareness of what each can and cannot accomplish.
It is of particular significance for this discussion that Lipman’s Philosophy for 
Children program represents a living model that can be used as a framework for the 
design and performance of philosophical inquiry in all disciplines—something that 
he himself contemplated but never realized. In this short paper, I will outline a few 
possible directions for opening spaces in school-based mathematical practices for 
philosophical deliberation in a community of inquiry, Lipman style.  I will argue 
that such an opening represents a potential expansion of students’ mathematical 
experiences—a way of nurturing and integrating a sense of the philosophical per-
spectives of the discipline into the regular math class that is larger and more  en-
compassing, and that promises to provide bridges for establishing richer and more 
meaningful connections and interactions with students’ personal experience, with 
other disciplines, and with the broader culture. But before embarking on this task, 
I will briefly delineate some key points of Lipman’s approach that are extrapolated 
from Dewey’s educational thought, and which I consider essential for this discus-
sion of the possibilities for and implications of conducting philosophical inquiry 
in the mathematics classroom.  
Key Points in Lipman’s Approach to Philosophical Inquiry
In his Philosophy for Children program, Lipman adopts virtually all the major el-
ements of Dewey’s pedagogy, including his emphasis on the primacy of thinking 
in education, and on the formation of habits of reflective thought as an ongoing 
process of reconstruction. In How We Think, Dewey succinctly describes the major 
tenets of such habit formation: “the problem of method in forming habits of reflec-
tive thought is the problem of establishing conditions that will arouse and guide 
curiosity; of setting up the connections in things experienced that will on later oc-
casions promote the flow of suggestions, create problems and purposes that will 
favor consecutiveness in the succession of ideas” (LW 8: 157). 
Lipman took from Dewey the notion that inquiry should begin with a par-
ticular experience—in this case a reading from a specially prepared philosophical 
novel, an exercise, or a list of questions—in order to provoke a unified cognitive 
event that is impregnated with conflicting ideas, that can prompt students to en-
counter uncertainty and perplexity, and that motivates them to inquire into the 
problematic of a situation and to search for its resolution. The communal delibera-
tive discussions that are the hallmark of Lipman’s method are natural outgrowths of 
previous discussions, intelligently guided by the teacher-facilitator, who as Lipman 
(1980) puts it, is always attempting to find the balance between “taking concepts 
apart and putting them back together” and between “generalizing and particular-
izing,” and whose goal is to move the discussion onto a “higher level of generality.” 
The communal thinking process that results is reminiscent of Vasily Davydov’s 
prescriptive outline for theoretical thinking as a process that aims at grasping the 
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general structural principles of a given learning situation and then locating those 
general patterns in basic, concrete problems (Davydov, 1990).
The agenda of the Lipmanian group discussion is guided by students’ interests, 
not by the logical organization of the subject matter. The latter is something that 
Dewey (1933) insisted was paramount for acquiring intrinsic meaning and under-
standing, but Lipman insists on the primacy of the students’ questions, induced by 
the problematic of a presented stimulus that guides the agenda of inquiry, and his 
goal is that students’ questions and interventions guide the inquiry process itself. 
In this case, what is seen and felt as problematic and perplexing in the situation 
presented by the stimulus must reflect the experiences of the group of students, or 
as Dewey puts it, the situation must “occasion” the inquiry.
Philosophical inquiry, in Lipman’s usage, is an encompassing term that sig-
nifies work related to reasoning and making judgments, conceptual analysis, and 
engagement in interpersonal communication and deliberation. His community of 
inquirers is understood as a habitat that facilitates the development of higher or-
der thinking, and which operates, as Vygotsky would have it, in a collective zone 
of proximal development that is more advanced than any individual member of 
the collective (Vygotsky, 1978). Meaning construction is embedded in a process of 
concept reconstruction, and carried forward by collective and collaborative argu-
mentation—a coconstructed process whereby propositions are made and justifica-
tions required, examined, agreed with, or contested. Disagreement forces deeper 
work on what warrants the given justifications, and it drives the group to develop 
and evaluate criteria for the making of judgments. As the given problematic is re-
flected upon by the group, the discussion moves from assimilation of frames and 
references, to reflection on the definition of terms, to exploring means for resolv-
ing the contradictions and aporias that have emerged, and finally to the conscious 
attempt at a productive judgment or set of judgments. 
The community of inquiry, by virtue of being the common space where in-
terpersonal meanings are coconstructed and negotiated, and a matrix in which 
what has been internalized by individuals gets externalized in new communication, 
also produces individual dispositions and reflective habits that are internalizations 
of procedures that originate in the community. As such, the experience of com-
munal philosophical inquiry, when it functions optimally, is an exemplar of what 
Dewey called “educative experience.” Such experience is affectively engaging and 
intelligently directed, where habit  is challenged by impulse, impulse is disciplined 
by habit, and real interest results in creative communication, thereby propelling 
expression of each individual’s powers through action. As Lipman simply put it, 
“Where meaning accrues there is education” (1980, p. 27). 
The ideal communal inquiry experience is thus potentially transformative, 
and the transformation in question is that of subjectivity itself. Through the pro-
cess of critical reflection on the problematic aspects of thought, language, and 
experience, members learn to isolate, combine, and recombine elements of their 
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own experience, thereby reconstructing it. It exemplifies Dewey’s notion of the 
transactional, whereby a situation comes to embody “complete interpenetration of 
self and the world of objects and events” (LW 10: 25). The reconstruction of habit 
that ensues is marked by a broadened perspective, a shift of attitude, an increase 
in knowledge—in short, in enduring changes of a psychological nature that fol-
low from the acquisition of new meanings. And on a social level, community of 
philosophical inquiry opens spaces for collective participation in the deliberative 
processes of appreciation, discernment, evaluation, of judging rather than passing 
judgment, opening discursive space for reasonable doubting, for not taking things 
for granted, for questioning assumptions—all aspects of what might be called “the 
philosophical attitude.”  
Through dialogical philosophical inquiry, Lipman sought to pursue what 
Dewey called “intellectual education”—the transformation of students’ raw pow-
ers into more refined, intelligent habits that engender deliberate, disciplined, and 
thorough inquiry when a situation calls for it. His ambition was to organize an en-
vironment for educative experience that supports the expansion of students’ habits 
of engagement, as well as a stable and sustained desire for further learning. Lipman 
was very much aware of the possibility that increased sensitivity, reasoned judg-
ment, and consciously maintained habits of thought can serve not only to accelerate 
children’s intellectual and psychological growth, but also to enlarge their desire for 
further learning and their capacity for growth. For that to happen, the intelligent 
organization of communal inquiry must guide those raw powers so as to generate 
a mutually reinforcing matrix in which students’ individual powers support each 
other well beyond what can develop in isolation. 
Wonder: The Lost Dimension in Mathematics Classroom 
Practice
Dewey’s question as to why  “children are so full of questions outside of school 
(so they pester grown-up persons if they get any encouragement),” yet somehow 
demonstrate a “conspicuous absence of display of curiosity about subject matter 
of school lessons” is still pertinent today, and especially so when we speak about 
math lessons (1916, p. 155).  Apart from the regular display of student apathy in the 
math classroom, school mathematical practices are notorious for producing math 
phobias and negative attitudes among a significant number of students (see, e.g., 
Tobias, 1993). A survey cited in Hersh and John-Steiner’s recent book, Loving and 
Hating Mathematics (2011), indicates that 40% of the adults interviewed reported 
aversive reactions to mathematics in school. The fact that students begin to dis-
like mathematics in their middle school years, usually between 4th and 8th grades, 
suggests that at some point the experience of mathematics turns “mis-educative” 
(Middleton & Spanias, 1999; House, 2006). Research into this phenomenon pro-
poses that it is a result of the ignoring of students’ interests, a pedagogy based on 
routine, the dominance of trivial activities and tasks, the increasing disconnection 
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of the subject matter from students’ everyday knowledge and experience, and the 
perceived irrelevance of math to students’ lives (see, e.g., Wells, 1999; Boaler, 2002). 
As a result, the driving force of learning—curiosity—is lost.
It is relevant here that Dewey ultimately refines his notion of curiosity in 
making a distinction between children’s general inquisitiveness, playful manipu-
lation, and information seeking and what he terms “intellectual curiosity.” Paolo 
Freire in fact makes the same distinction between what he calls “ingenuous” and 
“epistemological” curiosity, identifying the latter as an interest not just in what one 
knows but also in how one knows it. On both accounts, students’ natural curiosity 
requires stimulation and nurturance in order to develop in the direction of ongoing 
inquiry, not just about the world and their place in it, but additionally in the pow-
ers and limits of their own thinking. In this vein, Lipman (1996) suggests that in 
inaugurating a community of inquiry in the classroom, the teacher should provide 
a space—he calls it a “buffer”—between the culture and the child, where the child, 
together with others in a structured and disciplined inquiry environment, can make 
meaning and sense of the relation between the material and the social world, on the 
one hand, and the world of ideas that she encounters in the classroom, on the other.
Community of inquiry is not a new idea in mathematics education. The 
constructivist approach shared by leading math educators (e.g., Schoenfeld, 1989; 
Lampert, 1990; Cobb, Wood & Yackel, 1991; Cobb Boufi, McClain, & Whitenack, 
1997; Boaler & Humphreys, 2005; Goos, 2004) has long encouraged the creation 
of learning environments that recognize and utilize students’ informal knowledge 
and spontaneous concept development, and that leads students to work primarily 
in collaboration with their peers on mathematical tasks that are designed to encour-
age individual and group inquiry, the communication of mathematical ideas, and 
the communal exploration of proposed conjectures. Various forms of group pro-
cesses called “community of inquiry” have been consistently explored by teachers, 
researchers, and other practitioners in math education for the last 30 years, and a 
few have been hailed as a major pedagogical innovation in the discipline (NCTM, 
2000). However, while all of these forms of CI—whether called community of in-
quiry, community of learners, or community of practice—have been successful in 
promoting an exploration approach to mathematics, the exploration in question 
has typically remained in the traditional context of mathematical problem solving. 
In other words, the CI model has been exclusively focused on mathematical inquiry 
and other mathematical practices strictly circumscribed by disciplinary boundaries. 
Introducing Lipman’s broader philosophical approach to inquiry within the disci-
pline promises a more integral connection and communication between past and 
current experiences in mathematics by empowering students to draw more exten-
sively on previous knowledge, to think in more complex terms about the world, and 
to begin to overcome those yawning epistemological gaps between mathematical 
practices and the world of everyday reasoning and perception.
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Opening Spaces for Philosophical Inquiry in Mathematics 
Classroom Practices
The notion of “opening” a philosophical space in the mathematics classroom is of 
necessity imprecise and even misleading, given that this space is already a part of 
the epistemological terrain of any discipline, mathematics included. In current 
practice, it is a dormant or occulted space, a space ignored or concealed by me-
chanical pedagogies, and considered irrelevant to the acquisition of mathematical 
knowledge per se. I would suggest that the irrelevancy argument will not stand 
close scrutiny, however, given that philosophical inquiry is ultimately about con-
cepts, and that any inquiry into mathematical concepts should facilitate and ex-
pand student understanding. This is doubly obvious if we recognize mathematics 
not as a monolithic system, but as a human conceptual construction, and view 
mathematical objects as embodied concepts (Lakoff & Nunez, 2000). Mathemati-
cal concepts are constructs grounded in experience, and they can be encountered 
in different forms and under different aspects—never as a totality, but more as an 
assemblage of different elements that manifest themselves in different contexts 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). 
Any individual’s concepts are grounded in his or her lived experience, and 
their growth is shaped to a great extent by personal belief and personalized pro-
cesses of verification. Thus it is to be expected that there will be differences in the 
relationships between each student’s naïve and scientific concepts, between each 
student’s ability to navigate between descriptive and normative thinking, and in 
each student’s capacity to “break set” and think analogically, metaphorically, and 
across conventional categories. In an environment of communal, dialogical delib-
eration, these differences tend to emerge spontaneously in the course of discussions 
connected to a particular concept, and if the teacher allows and even encourages 
their expressions, mathematical inquiry often merges seamlessly into philosophical 
inquiry. For example, on one occasion I was working with a group of middle school 
students in comparing the infinite set of all natural numbers to the infinite set of 
even natural numbers, in order to answer the question whether those sets have equal 
numbers of elements. As the group struggled to work through several conflicting 
hypotheses, one student asked, “Is infinity a number?”  I seized the moment, and 
reoriented the mathematical inquiry towards a philosophical one by paraphrasing 
the question as “What is infinity?” The following discussion ensued:
Jimmy: Infinity is not a number.
Chas:  Infinity is not a number, a . . . it’s just in there . . .
Sally: If numbers are going forever I guess it’s a number.
Chas: It’s not exactly a number, that’s the name of the rest of the 
  numbers, . . . and they might skip a number when they go 
  through, they might go odd, odd, even, even, odd, even. 
  It’s a problem that they can change.
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Rush: . . . because the number infinity, it’s not like 1000 billion, 
  or 1000 trillion, it’s not like that and there is a whole bunch 
  of numbers inside infinity, so we don’t know whether inside 
  they’re skipping odd, even, even, even, odd.
Claire:  And what number comes before infinity? I don’t really 
  think that infinity is a number. Or a bunch of numbers, 
  what Rush is saying.
Sally:   He said that all the numbers are packed inside.
Jimmy: I think infinity is not a number, we just say this way—  
  endless.
Chas:    That’s what we said.
Mark:  Everybody seems to be saying this.
Victor: We are making our own definitions, ’cause the dictionary 
  is written by people and I think they may not be always 
  right. Infinity is just numbers that are too big.
Jimmy: Infinity just means expanding and expanding and expand
  ing. It means infiniteness.
Sally: O.K. That means that there are no numbers packed in in
  finity, but we just have infinite numbers packed in these 
  sets [in the infinite sets].
What, then, was learned here? The sudden shift in discourse created a space 
for students to agree and to disagree, to take apart and reassemble the concept of 
infinity even as they reflected on their own experiences and evaluated the propo-
sitions put forth by their peers. Apart from the reconstruction of concepts, this 
process also included the realization that different individuals conceive of infinity 
differently, but also that it is possible to hold back, to suspend one’s spontaneous 
judgments in order to refine the process of discernment, and that there is a sort of 
natural, intuitive methodology available to everyone for evaluating different concep-
tual positions. These discursive shifts from concrete mathematical inquiry to philo-
sophical inquiry and back to the mathematical promise to help students make sense 
of their previous experiences in the situation defined by the current problematic, to 
enrich meaning, and to enlarge conceptual understanding. Not always, however, 
will there be such spontaneous emergence of a space in which mathematical and 
philosophical inquiry can interact and, so to speak, cross-pollinate.  A framework 
is needed for a more permanent space, an “in-between” where the two conceptual 
universes can interact regularly. 
Such an in-between space is available as part of a broader curricular frame-
work that places philosophy and all the disciplines in a situation of encounter. A 
major pedagogical avenue for philosophical inquiry, and one demanding more work 
on the part of the teacher than is traditionally expected, is the method of prob-
lematizing the common, central, and contestable concepts that are shared by the 
disciplines of the school curricula—concepts like measurement, fact, objectivity, 
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certainty, change, chance, equality, structure, and so on. Each of these concepts is 
an assemblage of different meaning aspects derived from the disciplinary landscape 
it populates. For example, measuring an object’s height in mathematics or physics 
is different from measuring learning, or anxiety, or the difference between two po-
ems. Examination of the meanings of the same concept across different knowledge 
domains can allow new aspects of the former to be brought to light. It may produce 
a new synthesis of the problematized concept, as well as a heightened awareness and 
sophistication in its application to mathematical or empirical tasks. Indeed, since 
every concept is related to other concepts, it is impossible to approach a thorough 
grasp of a concept without tracing its connections with others, and without exam-
ining the latter in the process of, in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) words, “bringing 
forth” its meaning. This form of problematization can be seen in Dewey’s notion of 
“psychologizing” the subject matter, and presenting it in such a way that it becomes 
an occasion for philosophical inquiry. Lipman’s method involves problematizing 
the concept by pushing it beyond “normal” semantic boundaries into “fuzzy” areas, 
and highlighting aspects of it and its connections with other concepts that custom-
arily are not part of our conscious or unconscious associations and beliefs, and, as 
such, interrupting our mundane and trivial use of the concept. This is suggestive 
of Deleuze’s notions of deterritorialization and reterritorialization—like, in their 
somewhat extreme vocabulary, “hurling” the concept from its natural domain and 
“sending” it off to a territory in which it doesn’t belong in order to “turn it back 
against itself so as to summon forth a new earth” (Deleuze & Guattari, p. 99).
For example, in problematizing the concept “algorithm,” which might be de-
fined as “a finite sequence of well-defined instructions for completing a task,” we 
might examine the differences between the use of the concept in our everyday lives 
and its use in mathematics. One may inquire whether “algorithm” is recognizable 
in psychological and sociological contexts—do we think algorithmically in our 
everyday activities? Are there subconscious or unconscious algorithms that guide 
or underlie events like arguments, or shopping expeditions? Is an unconscious al-
gorithm an algorithm at all, or something else? Is there a difference between algo-
rithms for assembling a device of some kind and algorithms in mathematics? Is a 
mathematical formula an algorithm? Does the use of any algorithm require math-
ematical reasoning, and if so, what kind of reasoning? These questions interrogate 
the relation between this concept and other related concepts, such as “automatiza-
tion,” and even thinking in general. Making distinctions between concepts, and 
mapping a whole neighborhood of concepts that are seemingly close in meaning, 
is part of this sort of conceptual work, and as in the example above, concepts like 
algorithm, method, formula, plan, strategy, routine, and others can be reflected 
upon, clarified, and enriched in this way. Our expectation is that, after exporting the 
concept into other contexts and examining it there, our understanding is enhanced 
when it is re-imported into the universe of mathematics, with all of its newly ac-
quired dimensions accrued from its traversal of other disciplines. Similarly, spaces 
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for the problematization of more strictly mathematical concepts may be located 
among the discrepancies between different students’ definitions, interpretations, 
and understandings of a given concept, in the exploration of the relations between 
various internal aspects of a concept, or the relationships between it and other re-
lated concepts (Kennedy, 2012a; Kennedy, 2012b; Kennedy & Kennedy, 2011). This 
can be understood as a kind of conceptual boundary work, which acts not only to 
reveal and explore any ambiguity, vagueness, and misunderstanding in our under-
standing of the concept and its use, but also to reconstruct our conceptual schemata 
through a process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. 
Mathematization, Citizenship, and the Reconstruction of Habit 
Beyond the conceptual work outlined above, philosophical inquiry can also serve 
to furnish a more global perspective regarding mathematics, its nature, its aes-
thetic and ethical dimensions, and the cultural and political implications of the 
uses of mathematics in our society. To include opportunities in the curriculum for 
aesthetic inquiry into mathematical concepts through exploring phenomena like 
symmetry, fractals, patterns, and more offers the possibility of expanding student 
powers towards not only the appreciation of mathematical beauty, but also of de-
veloping criteria for aesthetic judgment in general. Inquiries into questions such as 
“Is there a connection between symmetry and beauty?” “When is a pattern beauti-
ful?” “What is an elegant math solution or proof?” and others not only may prompt 
students to think about math concepts in new ways, but also offers them the free-
dom of opportunity to relate to mathematics itself in a new way, and to have new 
experiences of “relatedness” that go beyond the current utilitarian concerns of the 
curriculum and its characteristic texts.  
For example, a major portion of the current school mathematics curriculum 
is devoted to utilizing or developing mathematical models that represent and can 
usefully describe a situation, and which allow further manipulation of the model 
in order to make predictions (NCTM, 2000). There is, however, little awareness of 
how those models correspond to the real world situations they model, and what the 
implications of those relationships are. A mathematical description always involves 
simplification and the making of assumptions on the part of the creator of the de-
scription (Shapiro, 2000). A mathematical description or model cannot, therefore, 
fully explain a nonmathematical situation or event without some account of the 
relationship between mathematics per se and scientific reality. Thus, a philosophical 
inquiry into the nature, uses, and inherent limitations of mathematical models, and 
into the implications of the use of such models in our social and practical lives, is 
necessary in everyday mathematical practice, lest we become captives and victims 
of those uses and limitations.
It is not enough to know how to use models—students also need to understand 
and know how these models shape and control our everyday lives. For example, the 
quantification of knowledge through different evaluation models, of which the SATs 
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are prime examples, raises questions not only regarding unstated epistemological 
assumptions and values; it also leads us to critically examine the role of mathematics 
in social reproduction, in determining social practices, and in organizing everyday 
experience. Those determinations follow on the general social and material blueprint 
of mathematics as a system and method, and they prefigure not only the mode of 
access to those products of mathematization, but also the mode of studying, using, 
interpreting, and evaluating them; thus, mathematics also acquires prescriptive and 
symbolic power (Davis & Hersh, 1986; Skovsmose, 1994). Unless these aspects of 
mathematics as we practice it are brought into the open and discussed, there is an 
obvious danger of our students turning into uncritical consumers of mathematics 
with little or no understanding of the worldview it reinforces, and with no critical 
competence to judge mathematical productions and prescriptions. 
Many proponents of critical mathematics education (e.g., D’Ambrosio, 2006; 
Skovsmose,1994; Bishop 1988, Keitel, Kotzmann & Skovsmose, 1993; Vithal, 2007) 
understand the development of critical competence as one of the essential problems 
of democracy, which, in their opinion, should  match mathematical and technologi-
cal development. If participation in a democratic society is not restricted to follow-
ing formal procedures of elections and government, but is understood as partici-
pating in direct democracy or, in Deweyan terms, as “a mode of associated living,” 
then citizens should be able to critically appraise and scrutinize not only the math 
instrumentarium, and its results, but also the implications of its use. The urgency 
of the need for the inclusion of critical inquiry into the ethical, social, and political 
aspects of the uses of the discipline in math education programs is particularly sa-
lient now, in a global economy dominated by finance, since it has been recognized 
that the global collapse of 2008 was caused by the uncritical and unethical exploi-
tation of mathematical financial models (Shrivastava & Statler, 2011). Inquiry into 
the ethical questions that pervade an increasingly mathematized world not only 
promises to raise awareness of the dangers of deceptively “value-free” instrumen-
talism, but also to open dialogue about the moral responsibility of the creators and 
the users of mathematical products. 
Yet another inquiry that may have far-reaching implications for the devel-
opment of the critical mathematical subject, and the prospects for the emergence 
of a truly autonomous citizenry, is epistemological. “Personal epistemology,” a 
term now commonly used to denote personal beliefs about knowledge and know-
ing (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000), is increasingly recognized as a powerful 
hidden shaper of student expectations and learning practices, and thus as crucial 
for individual learning and development. In Dewey’s terms, beliefs are habits that 
inform future action, but they are also susceptible to change through experience. 
For math learners, implicit and often unconscious beliefs about self in its relation to 
mathematics—about knowing, learning, and doing mathematics, about the social 
context of learning and doing mathematics, about the accessibility or inaccessibility 
of mathematics as a discipline, about its inherent value, usefulness or intrinsic inter-
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est—all of which make a crucial difference for success or failure in the classroom. 
Experiences that challenge negative beliefs and habits and render them inadequate 
promise to be transformational.  A form of epistemological inquiry that prompts 
students to reflect and deliberate together on questions like “Can I become a bet-
ter thinker? If so how?” “Can one be a good mathematician without knowing it?” 
“How do I know that I know or don’t know mathematics?” “How does one get to 
know mathematics?” “What does it mean to know mathematics?” “What is math-
ematical understanding?” “What kind of a math learner am I?”—such an inquiry 
may represent a form of educative experience that challenges tacit assumptions and 
inherited beliefs about the nature of knowing, understanding, and learning, and is, 
as such, a powerful tool for the reconstruction of belief. 
Conclusion 
In this article I have outlined several potential avenues for philosophical inquiry 
in the practice of classroom mathematics: concept work; philosophical inquiry 
into the common, central, and contestable concepts that are common to the vari-
ous disciplines; aesthetic inquiry in mathematics; inquiry into the benefits and 
the limitations of the mathematical instrumentarium; ethical inquiry into the 
uses of mathematics and in economy and society; and epistemological inquiry 
aimed at the reconstruction of mental beliefs and habits. Community of philo-
sophical inquiry, with its dialectical process of knowledge construction, invites 
children to pose questions of their own about mathematics, both in its internal 
relations and its relation to the world—and by implication encourages students to 
enter into dialogue with its epistemological assumptions and thereby take steps 
towards demythologizing mathematics and reconstructing critical core beliefs. 
Such communal experiences of philosophical inquiry, and their ongoing reinte-
gration with standard mathematical practice, promise to afford a larger space of 
inquiry for the student—one that is both more holistic and differentiated, more 
connected with experience, with knowledge, and with other disciplines. To in-
troduce group philosophical practice into the everyday world of the mathematics 
classroom represents a step towards the realization of Dewey’s vision of optimal 
educative experience as a process of continuous and cumulative interactions that 
build bridges between the child and the collective, the child and the curriculum, 
and the child and the cultural and social world.  
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